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Introduction
With the enactment of Law No. 43 of 1974 concerning the Investment of
Arab and Foreign Funds and the Free Zones,' Egypt embarked upon a policy
of actively encouraging foreign investment as a means of stimulating economic
development. This new policy, known in Arabic as al-Infitah or "openness,"
represented a marked departure from the Arab socialist economic orientation
of the Nasser era when the government, with its emphasis on centralized plan-
ning and the development of public sector enterprises, had virtually closed the
country to private foreign investment.
The passage of Law No. 43 of 1974 initially engendered great expectations in
both potential foreign investors and the Egyptian government. Attracted by
the country' large market, its sizeable pool of inexpensive labor, and its prox-
imity to the accumulating wealth of the Arabian Peninsula, numerous foreign
firms sent representatives and delegations to Egypt to explore the nature of the
economic opening and the prospects for profitable investments, particularly
those of the much heralded "trilateral" nature; i.e., projects which would
bring together Arab capital, western technology, and Egyptian manpower and
resources for productive purposes. This nearly overwhelming influx of
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visitors, in turn, gave the Egyptian government reason to believe that
numerous major investment projects would be undertaken within a very short
time.
These early expectations did not materialize fully. The relatively slow pace
of implementation may be attributed to a number of factors, including
political considerations, lack of infrastructure, insufficient incentives under
Law No. 43 and administrative difficulties. As foreign firms came to under-
stand some of the difficulties of operating in Egypt, many abandoned or
postponed plans for investment projects. For its part, the Egyptian govern-
ment became increasingly aware that numerous proposals resulting from such
visits either were not in the interests of the country or were merely disguised at-
tempts to sell technology. Nonetheless, certain foreign investments did take
place during the first three years of the operation of Law No. 43. By June 30,
1977, a total of 161 projects valued at E.E. 262.4 million, with a foreign ex-
change component of ..E. 210.9 million, were in operation. An additional 158
projects, valued at E.E. 692.1 million with a foreign exchange component of
E.E. 423.6 million, were then "under development." 2 The bulk of such
projects, however, took the form of banks, investment companies, touristic
enterprises, and real estate development schemes. Major industrial ventures of
the trilateral type which the government had hoped would revitalize the
economy were few and far between.
Initial expectations aside, the three years following the enactment of Law
No. 43 of 1974 proved to be basically a period of adjustment for both Egypt
and interested foreign firms. Indeed, such an adjustment was probably in-
evitable in view of the fact that the country had been closed to international
private investment for two decades and that therefore Egypt and foreign
businesses had much to learn about each other. Eventually, the Egyptian
government gained a better understanding of the objectives and methods of
multinational companies and began to search for new ways to facilitate the en-
try of foreign capital. Foreign investors, on the other hand, came to see that
they could solve many problems initially judged to be "insuperable" and that
they did have the ability to adjust to the conditions prevailing in the country.
Throughout this period, multinational companies, banks, and international
organizations engaged in an intense dialogue with the Egyptian government
concerning the problems impeding the effective implementation of the policy
of economic openness. Much, but by no means all, of this discussion centered
on Law No. 43, which had become both the symbol and the most authoritative
expression of the new policy. Ultimately, the government decided to amend
Law No. 43 of 1974 to take account of certain objections and criticisms raised
'Source: Unpublished figures supplied by the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones.
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by investors and others in a host of reports,' recommendations, and meetings.
On May 16, 1977, after careful consideration of a draft bill prepared by the
government, the People's Assembly of Egypt approved Law No. 32 of 1977,'
amending Law No. 43 of 1974.
The basic thrust of the 1977 amendments is to widen the opening created in
1974 and to remove many of the difficulties and uncertainties which foreign in-
vestors claimed were inhibiting investment in Egypt. The revision of Law No.
43 may therefore mark the beginning of a new and more dynamic phase of the
policy of economic openness. In an effort to determine the prospects for such
an eventuality, this article will examine the experience of the first three years
under Law No. 43 of 1974 and will then analyze the amendments contained in
Law No. 32 of 1977.
I. The First Three Years Under
Law No. 43 of 1977
In establishing a legal framework for the policy of economic openness, Law
No. 43 of 1974, as well as its implementing regulations,' sought basically to
achieve three things: (1) to define the types of investments desired by Egypt;
(2) to specify the guarantees and privileges to be accorded such investments;
and (3) to provide for an institutional apparatus to administer the investment
legislation. As time passed, potential investors encountered difficulties in each
of these three areas and asserted that such problems, real or perceived, were
significantly obstructing the entry of foreign capital. A brief examination of
the nature of these problems will contribute to an understanding of the amend-
ments that emerged in 1977.
A. THE NATURE OF DESIRED INVESTMENTS
Law No. 43 established a system requiring approval by the Egyptian govern-
ment of any investment proposal prior to its actual implementation; however,
neither the Law nor the regulations specified the precise nature of desired
projects or set down detailed objective criteria to be applied in appraising in-
vestment proposals. They merely stated that investments might be undertaken
in such areas as "industry, mining, energy, tourism, transportation and other
'See, e.g., REPORT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1976), prepared by the EGYPT-U.S. BUSINESS
COUNCIL.
'Published officially in issue no. 23 (bis) of June 9, 1977, of the Garida Rasmia, Egypt's Arabic-
language official gazette. The amendments became effective on June 9, 1977.
'Decision No. 91 of 1975 by the Prime Minister, Promulgating the Executive Regulations of
Law No. 43 for the Year 1974; published in the issue of January 30, 1975, of the Garida Rasmia,
the official gazette. Revised Executive Regulations implementing Law No. 43 as amended by Law
No. 32 were not, at the date this article was written, available in an official English version and are
accordingly not included in the present analysis.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 4
762 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
fields" but without indicating government priorities with respect to the various
sectors open to foreign capital. While the Law did direct the General Authority
for Arab and Foreign Investment-the agency charged with administering the
investment legislation-to prepare lists designating the specific types of
projects desired, such lists also proved fairly general in nature. Contrary to the
expectations of certain foreign firms, the General Authority never developed a
roster of specific project proposals to present to potential investors seeking
business opportunities.
The lack of specificity disturbed certain foreigners, who felt it demonstrated
that Egypt had not really delineated the precise role it wished foreign capital to
play in its economy. For them, Law No. 43 was, in the words of one American
lawyer, "merely an invitation to come in and negotiate a deal." Without more
precise guidance than that afforded by the Law and regulations, several
foreign companies claimed an unwillingness to spend funds on feasibility
studies for projects that in the end might not receive approval from the
General Authority.
It is difficult to determine the exact extent to which this alleged lack of
governmental specificity operated as a substantive obstacle to foreign invest-
ment. Demands for greater precision in the early stages of the policy may have
merely been a reflection of the foreign firms' lack of knowledge about the
Egyptian economy, a problem which eased with time as potential investors ac-
cumulated the necessary data and project ideas.6 In any event, by June 30,
1977, investors felt sufficiently confident of their role in the economy to have
incurred the expense of preparing and obtaining approval of some 641 projects
which contemplated a total investment of ,.E. 3,123.3 million.7
The dominant economic position of Egyptian public enterprises was another
factor which created an attitude of uncertainty among some foreign firms and
prompted a demand for a more specific delineation of the place granted
foreign private investment. Fearful of entering into a losing competition with
public corporations enjoying special advantages and subsidies, most investors
would have preferred Law No. 43 to designate certain sectors as the exclusive
domain of private enterprise or joint ventures. The Egyptian government
chose not to adopt such a solution, not only because the public sector would
have strongly opposed it, but also because it raised the specter of a return to an
economy dominated by foreign interests. In the end, investors had to make
their decisions empirically and on an ad hoc basis with respect to the nature of
'For example, in 1976, the Egypt-U.S. Business Council prepared abstracts of 35 feasible
projects in which it then attempted to interest American investors.
'See supra, note 2. The fact that an investment proposal has received an approval does not
necessarily mean the investor will proceed to implement the proposed project.
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their projects and the choice of their partners.'
In many ways, Law No. 43 concerned itself more with the nature of the
capital invested in a project than with the activities of the project itself. In-
deed, for this reason it was probably as much a foreign exchange law as it was
an investment promotion statute. Faced with the country's desperate shortage
of foreign currency, the government viewed the policy of openness as a means
to obtain the foreign exchange necessary for development. As a result, Law
No. 43 went to great lengths to assure that an investment made under its provi-
sions represented a net inflow of foreign resources and that the potential
demands of a project on Egypt's foreign exchange reserves would be minimal.
Thus, for example, regardless of the nationality of the owner, only free foreign
currency or assets imported from abroad could qualify as "invested capital"
under the Law." In addition, the effect of the provisions regarding transfer of
profits and capital was to encourage investments that would generate foreign
exchange through export earnings.
Indeed, for all practical purposes, export-oriented projects were the only
ones the Law contemplated. For not only did it reserve its most favorable
treatment for investments in the free zones, but it also specifically provided
that a project could repatriate earnings only to the extent that it earned suffi-
cient foreign exchange to do so. Moreover, no project was assured of foreign
exchange to cover debt servicing and expenditures abroad unless it had ade-
quate foreign revenues or financing. While it is true that Article 22(ii) of Law
No. 43 permitted "basic projects with major significance for the national
economy where no exports are contemplated" to transfer net profits in full,
neither the Law nor the regulations ever defined a "basic project" and in fact
until 1977 the general Authority never designated a project as such.
In general, potential investors were less certain than the government of
Egypt's comparative advantage as a site for exporting manufactured goods to
the world market. For them, the country's principal attraction was its popula-
tion of nearly 40 million people, constituting the largest market in the Middle
East. Most firms believed that the profitable investment opportunities in
Egypt lay in serving the domestic market and they therefore urged the govern-
ment to approve projects aimed at import substitution.
'With respect to the rules governing joint ventures, it should be noted that in 1975 the General
Authority issued "Model Articles of Incorporation for Joint Ventures Established in Accordance
with the Provisions of Law No. 43 for the Year 1974 in the form of Joint Stock Companies." The
General Authority required joint ventures to follow these model articles; however, Article 6 of
Law No. 32 of 1977 makes it clear that projects are not obliged to follow such model articles in-
sofar as its provisions do not relate to Egyptian public policy.
'However, reinvested profits could, under certain circumstances, qualify as invested capital, but
only upon the approval of the Board of Directors of the General Authority.
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Although Law No. 43 did not specifically forbid import-substitution enter-
prises, its restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange for the repatria-
tion of profits and the payment of expenditures abroad effectively precluded
them from consideration by investors in the absence of a special exception
granted by the government. Such an exception, however, if applied on a broad
basis, would have amounted to a significant alteration of the policy of
economic openness as orignally conceived. In addition, various officials
believed that requiring projects to export at least a portion of their production
would ensure that their technology and product quality met international stan-
dards. As a result, the Egyptian government generally adhered to its export-
oriented policy throughout the first three years and also refused to consider
alloting to import-substitution projects a portion of the foreign exchange
which their activities might save the country.
Preoccupations with questions of foreign exchange led to another, even
more serious problem: the appropriate exchange rate to be applied to the entry
of foreign capital, as well as to the repatriation of capital and profits. The
origins of this problem resided in the fact that Egypt had two basic exchange
rates for its currency: an "official rate" of approximately $2.50 to the pound
and a "parallel rate"'" of approximately $1.44 to the pound. Different rates
applied to different transactions and Law No. 43 specifically provided that all
foreign currency invested in approved projects was to be converted at the of-
ficial rate.
Potential investors judged the official rate to be artificially high and be-
lieved that its application would result in an unduly low evaluation of their in-
vestment in the project. They considered it particularly unfair in the case of
joint ventures with Egyptian partners since it distorted the relationship in the
real value of the assets contributed by the two parties to the enterprise. Denied
the benefits of the parallel market rate, investors sought to minimize the
adverse effects of the official rate by reducing cash contributions to a
minimum, by overvaluing foreign investments in kind, undervaluing the con-
tribution of local partners, and by capitalizing technology.
The problem of exchange rates was even more complex with respect to
repatriation of capital and profits. While Law No. 43 specifically stated that
invested currency was to be converted at the official rate, it also provided that
capital was to be repatriated at the "prevailing rate." Neither the Law nor the
'"In 1973, Egypt created the parallel market primarily to attract the savings of Egyptian
residents abroad by offering an incentive rate 50% above the official rate. In addition, foreign
revenues from tourism and certain designated exports could also be exchanged on the parallel
market. Egyptian firms, including those owned by foreigners, could purchase foreign exchange on
the market to finance the importation of specified items. In the following years, the Egyptian
government steadily expanded both the permissible sources of foreign exchange for the parallel
market as well as the list of imports it might finance.
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regulations indicated whether this expression referred to the prevailing official
rate or the prevailing parallel rate. The issue held more than academic interest
for many investors since the application of the parallel rate to the repatriation
of capital originally transferred at the official rate could, all other things being
equal,"I result in a loss of nearly 50 percent on the value of the investment.
To complicate matters even further, the Law's provisions on the repatria-
tion of profits gave no indication at all as to the appropriate rate to be used,
even omitting any reference to a "prevailing rate." Here, too, the application
of the parallel rite might have had disastrous results, for its effect, absent
careful planning in the joint venture documents, could have been to halve the
rate of return on an investment originally made at the official rate.
While the General Authority might have attempted to clarify the foreign ex-
change question through the issuance of a regulation, it never chose to do so.
On the other hand, in view of the importance of the question, many investors
felt that only an amendment of the Law itself would afford them the necessary
certainty. Eventually government officials did acknowledge the existence of a
problem in this area and promised a forthcoming legislative revision; however,
such statements merely persuaded many investors to await the amendment
before seriously considering an investment.
B. INCENTIVES, PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
Law No. 43, like most investment promotion acts, offered foreign capital a
variety of incentives, privileges, and exemptions as inducements to enter the
country. Indeed, it actually created two systems of privileges: one for "inland
projects" and a second, consisting of additional special privileges, for projects
located in free zones.
1. FISCAL INCENTIVES
The basic fiscal incentive for inland projects was an exemption from taxes
on industrial and commercial profits for a period of from five to eight years
beginning with the commencement of production. Believing such exemption to
be of minimal benefit to enterprises requiring as lengthy period of develop-
ment before becoming profitable, certain investors urged that its duration be
extended or that it be made to run from the first year in which the project ac-
tually showed a profit.
"This was not a necessary result, however, as original Article 21 spoke in terms of repatriating
the "registered" invested capital. Since Article 26 provided that invested capital, if in cash, was
"registered" in terms of the original currency units, a fluctuation of the rate for the Egyptian
pound would not have affected the amount that was permitted to be repatriated. For example, a $1
million investment, valued at the official rate of L.E. 400,000, if sold later for L.E. 700,000, could
have resulted in a permissible repatriation of L.E. 700,000 which at the parallel rate would equal
the $1 million of invested capital as originally registered.
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American investors, in particular, feared that the entire tax exemption might
be illusory with respect to their projects because of the nature of U.S. tax law
and the language of a condition attached to Article 16 of Law No. 43 granting
the exemption:
These exemptions shall remain applicable only so long as the profits of the project are
not, as a consequence, subject to taxation in the foreign investor's home country or in
any other country.
The intent of this provision was to ensure that any revenue loss to the Egyp-
tian treasury because of the exemption would benefit the investor rather than
the treasury of another country. Under American law, however, a U.S. cor-
poration would be subject to taxation on profits earned on a direct Egyptian
investment in the year made and on the dividends from an Egyptian subsidiary
in the year of distribution to the parent. The Egyptian tax exemption would, of
course, result in increased profits on a direct investment and eventually in
larger dividends on an investment in a subsidiary, both of which would in turn
lead to an increased tax liability for an American investor under U.S. law. In
such event, could it be said that the profits of the project were as a conse-
quence of the exemption subject to taxation in the United States, thereby dis-
qualifying it completely from the benefits of the exemption? Neither the
General Authority nor any other Egyptian agency gave a definitive answer to
this question, and it therefore remained the subject of controversy and uncer-
tainty for American firms throughout the first three years following the enact-
ment of Law No. 43.
The above-mentioned problem did not arise in the case of Free Zone
projects because the Law gave them a general income tax exemption without
imposing conditions or time limits;' 2 however, they did face a vexing issue in
the form of the annual duty imposed on their operations. In order to support
the administrative and infrastructural costs of the free zones, the Law levied
an annual duty of 1 percent of the value of goods entering and leaving the free
zone for the account of the project. In practice, since the duty was based on
the total value of goods entering or leaving the zone, rather than on the profits
of the project, it proved to be a rather onerous burden on enterprises with a
low profit margin and a high turnover. In certain cases, it significantly reduced
the attractiveness of situating projects in a free zone.
Regardless of exemptions, it was generally agreed that the Egyptian tax law
on incomes and profits was in need of a thorough revision to make it accord
with the spirit and aims of the policy of openness. Its exceptionally high per-
sonal income tax rates, which reached a maximum of 95 percent on incomes
"The provisions of the Law were, however, somewhat ambiguous as to whether dividends and
distributed profits of free zone projects were also exempt from taxation.
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about ,.E. 10,000 proved to be a significant obstacle in recruiting foreign staff
for "inland projects."' 3 To obviate the hardships of the Egyptian tax law,
many enterprises paid their managers and technicians additional sums to com-
pensate for the tax loss or engaged in various strategems to reduce the ap-
parent amount of income paid in Egypt.
2. FOREIGN EXCHANGE PRIVILEGES
As indicated above, a project without sufficient foreign earnings or financ-
ing had no assurance of being able to obtain foreign exchange to meet its
needs. This uncertainty proved to be a major obstacle in planning and develop-
ing an enterprise. Before making a financial commitment, investors naturally
wanted some assurance that they would be able, at a very minimum, to obtain
foreign exchange for necessary imported raw materials and spare parts. In
view of the country's exceptionally acute balance of payments problems, the
Egyptian government was exceedingly reluctant to make any such guarantee.
In time, however, beginning with the expansion of the parallel market in 1974,
the establishment of foreign banks, and the creation of the "own exchange
market" in 1976," foreign exchange became increasingly available, albeit at a
premium.
3. EXEMPTIONS FROM RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
AND LABOR LAWS
Law No. 43 exempted approved projects from some of the more onerous
restrictive legislation enacted during the Nasser era to foster the socialist objec-
tives of the day. As a result, approved investment projects, unlike ordinary
Egyptian companies, were not required to have worker representation on the
board of directors or to pay a fixed percentage of profits to employees. Despite
these exemptions, investors soon found that the business and labor laws of
Egypt contained a multitude of other restrictions which rendered efficient
operations and effective management difficult. For example, Law No. 113 of
1961 prevented a company from paying its chairman, board members, or
managing director compensation in excess of L.E. 5000 a year. Law No. 26 of
1954 prohibited the negotiability of shares for two years following the incor-
poration of a company, and it also forbade the members of the board of a
joint stock company from working for another company without the express
authorization of the President of the Republic. And Law No. 91 of 1959 re-
quired employers to hire workers in accordance with the chronological order
of their registration at the Labor Office. It soon became clear that the entire
'The foreign personnel of free zone projects were completely exempt from Egyptian income
taxation.
"The "own exchange" system allows Egyptians owning foreign currency to buy specified im-
ports without converting their currency through the Egyptian banking system.
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body of Egyptian business law was in need of a thorough revision to bring it
into accord with the spirit of the new policy. In the meantime, investors sought
to obtain additional exemptions from unduly restricted provisions.
C. THE INSTITUTIONAL APPARATUS
The creation of an appropriate institutional apparatus to encourage foreign
investment in the midst of a massive bureaucracy and a public sector devoted
to Arab socialism proved to be an almost herculean task. Nonetheless, despite
numerous investor complaints about "bureaucratic problems," the first three
years of the new policy did witness significant progress in this area.
Law No. 43 entrusted the General Authority for Arab and Foreign Invest-
ment and the Free Zones with direct responsibility for administering its provi-
sions, including the approval of investment proposals, the supervision of free
zones, and the general encouragement of foreign investment in Egypt.
Originally subject to the Organization for Arab and International Coopera-
tion, the General Authority in July, 1975, was transferred to the supervision of
the Minister of Economy and Economic Cooperation, who was also made the
Chairman of the General Authority's Board of Directors. This organizational
change did much to strengthen the position of the General Authority within
the Egyptian government.
In its early days, insufficiency of staff plagued the General Authority and
prevented it from executing its statutory duties efficiently. Foreign investors
found, for example, that they often had to wait for as much as twelve months
to secure a decision from the Authority on an investment proposal. Over time,
the General Authority gradually increased and improved its staff, introduced
new procedures, determined the precise nature of the information required of
investors, and clarified various aspects of the policy of openness, thereby
reducing delays to the point where a decision on an adequately documented
proposal might be received within two to three months of its submission. In
addition, it made efforts to improve coordination with other government
departments, although much remained to be done in-this area even after the
passage of three years.
II. The Revision of Law No. 43 of 1974
In response to the concerns expressed by investors, the Egyptian government
decided, by mid-December 1976, to amend Law No. 43. " While it is generally
acknowledged that many, if not all, of the legal problems encountered during
the first three years might have been resolved by either (i) administrative
'The decision was made by the recently appointed group of Ministers under the direction of the
Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs.
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regulation at the ministerial level' 6 or (ii) modification of ancillary
legislation, 17 the decision to revise Law No. 43 itself seems to have been based
on three grounds. First, it was Law No. 43 that had been the principal focus of
comment and criticism by the investing community. Second, a legislative
amendment would provide more authoritative guidance than would a regula-
tion to persons charged with implementing the law and would in addition
demonstrate that the country's elected representatives continued to support
strongly the government's policy of economic openness. Finally, a revision of
Law No. 43 could be accomplished more quickly than a modification of the
various ancillary laws affecting foreign investment." In the interests of
developing a stable legal environment for foreign investment, the government
chose to maintain the basic framework of Law No. 43 rather than to adopt an
entirely new act on the subject.
A. THE PROCESS OF REVISION
The process of revision, which included close communication between the
government and the private sector, and the speed (five and one-half months)
with which it was accomplished, clearly demonstrate Egypt's strong deter-
mination to pursue the openness policy and create a more favorable climate
for foreign investment.
The international investing community was first made aware of the specific
areas that the revision would cover by the General Authority's issuance, in late
December 1976, of a brief outline of the changes in the Law being considered.
While the outline produced further comments and was generally favorably
received by the investors, the need for a more detailed itemization of proposed
amendments was recognized by late January 1977. Accordingly, the General
Authority decided it would be appropriate, prior to amending the Law, to
establish further dialogue between the persons who would be affected by the
amendments and the officials responsible for preparing the draft legislation.
The goal of this dialogue was to avoid potential confusion arising from the
adoption of amendments presented to the investor as a fait accompli; the of-
ficials would instead explain what the proposed amendments entailed and
would solicit comments with a view toward their possible incorporation in the
draft to be submitted to the People's Assembly.
To provide a forum for the dialogue, the General Authority organized a
series of seminars and a public workshop on the proposed amendments to Law
"For example, administrative regulations could have clarified the exchange rate issue as well as
provided guidelines for the "basic projects" exception of Article 22(2). See text supra at p. 763.
"For example, onerous provisions of the Companies Law could have been corrected by amend-
ment of that law.
'The draft legislation for a revision of Egypt's tax laws has been under consideration for at least
two years.
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No. 43. During the seminars, government officials and private sector represen-
tatives discussed proposed changes, considered earlier written comments on
the Law, and produced specific recommended changes which were to serve as
the focus of the workshop. On February 26, 1977, the public workshop was at-
tended by approximately 100 local and foreign businessmen, lawyers and
government officials met to exchange views on the proposed changes. No
recommendations, as such, were solicited, but comments concerning the prob-
lems of Law No. 43 specifically, and improving the investment climate
generally, were encouraged.
Following the workshop, the participants in the working session met to draft
the text of the proposed amendments. This draft incorporated several of the
concepts discussed by workshop participants. After additional discussions
with business leaders and international financing organizations, it was sub-
mitted to the Cabinet several days following the workshop.
After a review by the Cabinet, the Council of State and legislative leaders,
the draft was submitted to the People's Assembly in early May. Following a
lengthy article-by-article debate," the revision was completed by the adoption
of Law No. 32 of 1977, which became effective on June 9, 1977.
B. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AMENDMENTS
As indicated above, the experience in implementing Law No. 43 of 1974 dur-
ing the first three years revealed several significant problems, including-
(1) the nature of permissible projects, particularly in the area of import
substitution;
(2) the application of the appropriate exchange rate;
(3) the repatriation of capital and profits;
(4) the interpretation and application of the fiscal exemptions; and
(5) the restrictions persisting in the company and labor legislation.
Law No. 32 of 1977 sought to resolve each of these difficulties.
1. THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE PROJECTS EXPANDED
a. Export Projects vs. Import-Substitution Projects
Under the original provisions of Law No. 43, export oriented projects were
favored in at least two significant ways: (i) Article 22, dealing with the
repatriation of profits, conferred a general right to repatriate earnings only in
"The government's draft bill was considerably altered by the People's Assembly. It is in-
teresting to note that while relatively few changes were made with respect to the original bill's
treatment of foreign investment, there was a significant reduction of the incentives for the purely
domestic private sector.
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the event that a project was self-sufficient in its foreign currency needs.
Because the original text of Article 14, dealing with a project's foreign ex-
change account, required foreign currency deposits to have their source from
outside the country, the two original provisions had the effect of requiring
projects to produce primarily for export in order to be entitled to transfer
profits abroad. 20 The exemption to this general rule, provided in the original
text of Article 22(2), dealing with "basic projects" which would be entitled to
transfer their profits in full regardless of their foreign current earnings, was
never implemented. Failure to implement Article 22(2), which would have met
the needs of import-substitution projects, could be attributed to the open-
ended nature of the exemption: if an import-substitution project was deemed
"basic," it would have the right to transfer 100 percent of its profits regardless
of the country's current foreign currency position.
Both Articles 14 and 22 have been revised so that import substitution
projects may now be encouraged to come to Egypt. Under the new provisions,
profits generated in the local market in Egyptian currency are transferable as
follows:
1) Revised Article 22(2) eliminates the requirement that an import-
substitution project be "basic" and, within limits negotiated with the
Authority at the time of approval (and within the foreign currency
regulations), permits repatriation of all or part of the profits generated in
the local market; and
2) Revised Article 14 permits a project to obtain foreign exchange locally by
e.g., selling local currency to banks and by making local sales in exchange
for foreign currency. It may also be possible for a project to acquire
foreign currency in the newly created "own" exchange market.
Thus the right to transfer profits abroad is given by revised Article 22(2) and
the availability of foreign exchange to fund that right is dealt with in revised
Article 14.
b. Projects Financed Exclusively in
Local Currency
As originally enacted, Law No. 43 of 1974 did not apply to investments
made entirely in Egyptian currency and local resources by Egyptian nationals.
The 1977 revision has expanded the scope of the Law in a second respect by
granting such projects many of the same benefits accorded to foreign in-
vestors2" and by giving the General Authority similar responsibilities with
"See text, supra, pp. 763-764
'Law No. 86 of 1974 provided similar tax incentives to projects financed exclusively with local
currency as were available to Law No. 43 projects. However, no mechanism was established to ad-
minister the former law and its impact on the local private sector was negligible. Revised Article 6
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respect to the approval and supervision of such local projects as it has had over
foreign investments and joint ventures. 22
c. Other Permissible Activities
The 1977 amendments further broaden the scope of permissible projects by
defining several new fields of activity in which they might engage. To stimulate
construction within the country, as well as to encourage the introduction of
needed technology, the Law now allows approved projects in the following
newly designated fields:
* construction activities in regions outside the agricultural areas and the
perimeters of existing cities;
" construction contracting activities carried out by joint venture stock com-
panies in which Egyptian participation constitutes not less than 50 percent
of the capital; and
* technical consulting activities in the form of joint stock companies and
in participation with foreign international consulting firms where such
activities are related to and required by a project approved under Law
No. 43.
2. CLARIFYING THE EXCHANGE RATE
To end the confusion caused by the existence of multiple exchange rates for
the Egyptian pound, Law No. 32 introduces a new Article 2 (bis) which pro-
vides that the transfer of invested capital, as well as the repatriation of capital
and the transfer of profits, is to be effected at a single rate of exchange, which
is "the highest rate prevailing and declared applicable for free foreign currency
by the competent Egyptian authorities." Announced periodically by the Cen-
tral Bank of Egypt, this "highest rate" applies to all the foreign currency
transactions of projects approved under revised Law No. 43, including funds
transferred to Egypt for the purchase of land and other real property con-
stituting an integral part of the capital assets of the project. 3
With respect to projects that had transferred their capital to Egypt prior to
the revision, Law No. 32 is less clear and has been the subject of some con-
troversy. Capital previously transferred at the official rate may be revalued in
of Law No. 43 extends the privileges and exemptions of Articles 9, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 to projects
financed entirely in local currency. Significantly, exemptions from restrictions on the transfer of
profits and capital, as well as from certain provisions of local Labor and Companies Law, are thus
not available to such projects.
"An Egyptian national making an investment at least partially in foreign currency remains en-
titled to the full benefits of Law No. 43 of 1974, as has been the case since its enactment.
"The intent of this provision appears to be that land and real property purchased for speculative
purposes and not constituting an integral part of the capital assets of an approved project insofar
as such property is not directly necessary for the project's operation must be paid for in foreign
currency converted at the official rate.
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accordance with the "highest rate" upon the approval of the partners
representing three-quarters of the capital of the project or by a resolution of an
extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders." Such revaluation may be
accomplished, with no imposition of a tax, either by increasing the value of the
shares or by issuing non-voting bonus shares equivalent to the difference
resulting from the revaluation.
In the event that no voluntary revaluation takes place pursuant to the rules
described above, Law No. 32 provides that all participations shall continue to
be valued at the official rate at which they were transferred and that the right
to share in profits shall continue as originally provided when the project was
approved. Thus, if there was an existing controversy arising from the am-
biguity of Law No. 43's original treatment of the exchange rate issue, Law No.
32 standing alone does not appear to resolve it.
3. REPATRIATION OF CAPITAL
In addition to removing the problem of multiple exchange rates, the
amended Law establishes sbmewhat more flexible rules concerning the
repatriation of capital. Originally, Law No. 43 limited the amount of
repatriated capital to the value of invested capital plus a rate to be fixed by the
General Authority to meet any rise in the value of the investment. The 1977
revision has deleted this limitation; consequently, an investor may repatriate
the full amount realized through sale or liquidation. In addition, whereas
repatriation of capital must normally take place in five equal annual in-
stallments, it may now be effected immediately and in full, subject only to
notification of the General Authority, if an investor has disposed of his invest-
ment for foreign currency or if the credit balance in the foreign exchange ac-
count is sufficient to cover the transfer. Shares offered in free foreign currency
may in all cases be sold through an Egyptian Stock Exchange in which event
the proceeds are immediately transferable to the seller's account abroad.
If an investor sells his interest for local currency, the purchaser is entitled to
enjoy all the benefits of Law No. 43, except the right to transfer funds abroad.
Previously, the Law denied such a purchaser any of its privileges.
2 Article 5, Law No. 32 of 1977. Note that this Article is not a part of Law No. 43 as amended
and is found exclusively in Law No. 32. In the case of joint ventures between Egyptian and foreign
partners, revaluation may, of course, have the effect of altering the relationship between the par-
ties, with respect to such matters as sharing in profits and capital, to the benefit of the foreigner
and to the detriment of the Egyptian insofar as the latter has not contributed capital in the form of
foreign currency or assets imported from abroad. As a result, one can expect Egyptian partners to
resist attempts at revaluation, particularly in joint ventures where the shares are fairly evenly
divided between the two parties. In such cases, it will be difficult for the foreign partner to muster
the required three-quarters majority or to pass a resolution at an extraordinary general meeting of
shareholders, which, according to the Model Articles for Joint Ventures, requires a quorum
representing two-thirds of the capital of the company.
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4. THE FISCAL INCENTIVES
a. The Tax Holiday
New article 16, relating to the tax holiday, enumerates the specific taxes
from which projects are exempt and now makes it clear that both projects and
persons receiving distributions therefrom are exempt from the General Tax on
Income. Moreover an extended tax holiday of from ten to fifteen years has
been added to the Law for projects involving reconstruction, land reclama-
tion, and the establishment of new cities.
The 1977 amendment also significantly alters the troublesome second
paragraph of Article 16, discussed above, which attached a confusing condi-
tion to the tax holiday. As a practical matter, it would have been difficult, as
the article originally required, to determine with any degree of accuracy
whether, as a consequence of the Egyptian tax exemption, the profits
generated by a project were taxed in a foreign country." Under the revised ar-
ticle, projects will be entitled to the exemptions set forth therein regardless of
the tax policy of the investor's home country, and foreign firms may seek max-
imum utilization of the tax holiday in accordance with their overall strategy;
however, the exemption from the General Tax on Income "is conditioned
upon such income not being subject to similar taxation in the investor's home
country or in the country to which income is transferred, as the case may be."
Unfortunately, the wording of this provision is likely to raise questions in the
minds of investors, not the least of which are (a) the meaning of "similar taxa-
tion," and (b) the extent to which the exemption would be lost.16
The original text of Law No. 43 was not clear as to whether distributed
profits, as well as the earnings of the project itself, would enjoy a tax holiday,
or whether such distributions are exempt only to the extent of 5 percent of the
investor's capital. It is now clear, as a result of the revision, that the 5 percent
exemption from the General Tax on Income provided for in Article 17 comes
into operation at the end of the tax holiday and does not affect the complete
exemption from such tax of both profits and distributions for the initial tax
holiday period.
b. A New Exemption for Foreign Employees
It should be noted that revised Article 20 exempts all wages, salaries, or
similar payments made to an approved project's foreign employees from the
"See text, supra, pp. 765-766.
"For example, a reasonable interpretation of the provision might be that if Country X imposed
what was deemed a "similar" tax on a Law No. 43 project, but at a lower rate than that exacted
under Egypt's General Tax on Income, the exemption would be lost, not in toto, but only to the
extent of the tax paid to Country X.
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General Tax on Income, thus granting them tax treatment which previously
only foreign employees in the free zones had enjoyed.
c. Alteration of the Free Zone Duty
As indicated above, the 1 percent duty charged to Free Zone projects was
considered to be high for enterprises with a low profit margin. Under revised
Article 46 of the Law, the one percent rate is now established as a maximum
duty; however, projects may be subjected to a lesser duty where warranted by
their profit margin and other circumstances. Projects whose principal ac-
tivities do not involve the entry and exit of commodities from the free zone
continue to be subject to an annual duty not exceeding 3 percent of the value
added. Revised Article 37 offers an additional fiscal incentive to free zone
manufacturing projects as it reduces customs duties by 50 percent on free zone
products imported into Egypt where 40 percent of the components of such
products are of local origin.
d. Reductions of Miscellaneous Fees
Revised Article 23 reduces, and in some cases, eliminates entirely several of
the incidental fees and stamp duties originally required of Law No. 43
projects. The frequently onerous Endorsement Fee imposed on companies
formed in Egypt27 is now limited to of 1 percent of the project's capital to a
maximum of 1,000 L.E. Moreover, the contracts establishing the project, as
well as all contracts relating to a project including loan agreements,
mortgages, construction contracts, and contracts for the purchase of real
estate and machinery are exempt from stamp duties, registration and publica-
tion fees for a period of one year following commencement of a project's
operations.
5. NEW EXEMPTIONS FROM THE COMPANIES LAW AND
LABOR LEGISLATION
In an effort to facilitate the operation of foreign investments, amended Ar-
ticles 11 and 12 grant approved projects additional exemptions from certain
restrictive provisions of the companies and labor laws. Thus, for example,
projects need no longer advertise vacant posts publicly prior to hiring, nor
must they hire workers in accordance with their date of registration at the
Labor Office. Moreover, the management of joint stock companies will be
considerably eased with the lifting of various restrictions on the maximum
salaries of directors, interlocking directorates, dividend policies and the
negotiability of shares.
"This fee was sometimes avoided by forming the company through an Egyptian consular office
outside Egypt.
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6. INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS
Law No. 32's only direct impact on the administrative organization charged
with implementing Law No. 43 was to broaden its jurisdiction to encompass
investments of the purely local private sector in addition to those of a foreign
or joint venture nature. To reflect this broadened jurisdiction, the organiza-
tion's name was shortened from the "General Authority for Arab and Foreign
Investment and Free Zones" to the "General Authority for Investment and
Free Zones." The name change may also be attributable in part to a desire to
deemphasize the distinction between Arab and non-Arab investments.
The indirect impact of both the government-private sector dialogue that
took place throughout the amendment process, as well as the preceding three
years' experience, have been greater in terms of shifting the General Authori-
ty's emphasis from screening and control to promotion. Public statements by
the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs and by General Authority
spokesmen indicate that there is at present a greater stress being placed on ser-
vices to the investor and facilitating the implementation of projects.
Moreover, while the General Authority has not yet become a "one-stop"
center for investors, the government has made significant progress in coor-
dinating the activities of the various ministries affecting foreign investment
projects. The General Authority's staff and physical facilities have been
upgraded to reflect its new direction, and both the Board of Directors of the
General Authority and the newly created Supreme Council for Investment
(chaired by the Prime Minister) are taking steps to reduce interministerial con-
flicts and delays.
Under current procedures, an investor is likely to receive a decision within as
few as three months if he submits an adequately prepared proposal and
feasibility study to the Department of Project Appraisal of the General
Authority. The Department then makes an economic analysis of the proposal
while requesting the competent Ministry, such as the Ministry of Industry or
Tourism, to give a technical opinion. On the basis of these studies, the staff of
the General Authority prepares a recommendation for its Board of Directors
which meets monthly. Thereafter, the Authority informs the investor of the
decision of the Board by letter, attaching thereto a copy of the Board resolu-
tion which, under Egytian law, has the effect of an administrative decision.
The investor then has six months within which to begin implementing his
project, subject to extension by decision of the Board.
Conclusion
The 1977 amendments to Egypt's foreign investment law have resolved most
of the legal problems revealed during the first three years of the policy of
economic openness. The provisions on foreign exchange rates, tax holidays,
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and access to foreign currency are clear and, for the most part, seem to have
won the acceptance of foreign investors. Moreover, the revision has greatly ex-
panded the scope of the economic opening by specifically allowing import-
substitution projects to serve the Egyptian market. Throughout this period of
adjustment, the Egyptian government itself showed great openness to the
opinions and criticisms of investors, involving them closely in the process of
revision and in the end incorporating many of their suggestions into the revised
law.
A previous article in this journal"' suggested that the adoption of Law No.
43 of 1974 would lead to the revision of a major portion of Egyptian legisla-
tion, at least as it related to business and commerce. Despite early declarations
to this effect, the government has thus far refrained from broad-scale law
reform but has instead chosen merely to exempt foreign investment from the
more onerous legislative provisions. This practice, which may be a satisfactory
expedient in the short term, cannot create in the long run an adequate legal en-
vironment for the modern operation of foreign investment and a resurgence of
the Egytian private sector. Ultimately, Egypt will have to revise its business
laws to bring them into conformity with the spirit of economic openness and to
modernize the underlying commercial legislation which for the most part is
based on pre-World War II laws from France.
Law, of course, is merely one element in the creation of a favorable invest-
ment climate. Egypt's antiquated infrastructure, its chronic balance of
payments deficits, and its massive and sometimes unresponsive bureaucracy
are among the remaining major obstacles to the successful implementation of
the foreign investment policy. In each of these areas, as well as many others,
the government is making a major effort to improve the situation, but progress
will no doubt be slow in view of the enormity of the task. Above all else,
however, the primary constraint on the economic development of Egypt and
the creation of an optimum climate for investment remains the unsettled
political situation in the Middle East. Should current peace initiatives achieve
fruition, it is not unreasonable to expect that Egypt will experience the kind of
massive infusion of western technology and Arab capital which the architects
of the openness policy from the very start had hoped would transform the
country.
2 See supra, note 1.
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